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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Brandon Tyler Bahr was convicted of first degree murder,
grand theft, and petit theft, and was sentenced to an aggregate term of life
imprisonment, with 25 years fixed. Mr. Bahr appeals from his judgment of conviction,
raising two claims of error.
First, Mr. Bahr asserts the district court violated his constitutional right to due
process when it incorrectly instructed the jury in response to a jury question.

The

district court instructed the jury that it was for the jury to determine whether the
verbalization of a threat to kill is the same as a decision to kill. Mr. Bahr asserts that this
instruction was an incorrect statement of law, that the district court should have
answered that a threat and decision are not the same, and that the instruction violated
his right to due process of law because it relieved the State of its burden to prove the
element of premeditation. Because the jury reached its verdict based on an erroneous
instruction, Mr. Bahr’s first degree murder conviction must be vacated.
Second, Mr. Bahr asserts the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
support his conviction for grand theft. Specifically, the State failed to prove intent to
deprive or appropriate, at the time Mr. Bahr took the handgun used in the shooting. As
such, Mr. Bahr also asserts that this Court must vacate his conviction for grand theft.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Bahr began dating Ryan Havlina in December 2012. (Tr., p.1548, Ls.5-16.)
Mr. Bahr and Ms. Havlina broke up in August 2015 and Ms. Havlina began dating
Zacheriah Peterson shortly thereafter.

(Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),
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p.601.) Over the course of September 23, 2015, Mr. Bahr exchanged text messages
with Ms. Havlina in which he accused her of cheating on him with Mr. Peterson, and
threatened her and Mr. Peterson. (Tr., p.932, L.10 – p.937, L.14.) Mr. Bahr arranged,
through Ms. Havlina, to meet Mr. Peterson for a fight. (Tr., p.665, L.18 – p.666, L.18,
p.1553, Ls.1-25.)
Before the meeting between Mr. Bahr and Mr. Peterson was fully arranged,
Mr. Bahr went to his house “to get a gun” because “[he] wanted to point it at
[Mr. Peterson] and scare him.” (Tr., p.1554, Ls.2-10.) He took a loaded, 9 millimeter
Makarov belonging to his mother’s boyfriend, Rusty Powell, out of the top drawer of
Mr. Powell’s nightstand.

(Tr., p.1360, Ls.13-21, p.1403, Ls.3-4, p.1555, Ls.13-25.)

Both Rusty Powell and his son, Ryan, testified that Mr. Powell had given permission to
Ryan to use this gun, but had never given such permission to Mr. Bahr. (Tr., p.1356,
L.19, p.1412, Ls.11-19.)
Mr. Bahr and Mr. Peterson first planned to meet at 21st and State Street in Boise.
(Tr., p.1561, Ls.15-17.) Ms. Havlina changed the location to the Depot because there
were too many police officers at 21st and State Street. (Tr., p.1561, L.21 – p.1562, L.1.)
Mr. Bahr was worried “they were planning to do something more than just beat me up.”
(Tr., p.1562, Ls.2-4.) At some point, Mr. Bahr spoke to Mr. Peterson, who told him “to
bring more friends so it would be more enjoyable for him.” (Tr., p.1560, Ls.11-16.)
Mr. Bahr told Mr. Peterson he was coming alone. (Tr., p.1560, L.24 – p.1561, L.2.)
One of Mr. Peterson’s friends, Joe Delguidice, who went to the Depot with Mr. Peterson,
testified he understood there was going to be a fistfight between Mr. Peterson and
Mr. Bahr. (Tr., p.668, Ls.14-25, p.701, Ls.8-25.) Mr. Delguidice’s girlfriend, Jasmine
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Hamby, who also went to the Depot, testified that she also understood there was going
to be a fight. (Tr., p.1450, Ls.4-15.) Mr. Delguidice cautioned Mr. Peterson not to go
overboard, just to knock Mr. Bahr out and leave him. (Tr., p.700, Ls.4-9.)
Before going to the Depot, Mr. Bahr went to Walmart and took a black bandana
without paying for it. (Tr., p.1196, Ls.12-19.) He testified he wanted “to cover [his] face”
to scare Mr. Peterson. (Tr., p.1561, Ls.3-8.) When he arrived at the Depot, Mr. Bahr
looked for Mr. Peterson, intending to point the gun at him and scare him. (Tr., p.1565,
L.17 – p.1566, L.4.) Mr. Bahr saw two people, and called out, “Are you Zach? Are you
Zach?” (Tr., p.677, L.15 – p.678, L.25, p.1566, Ls.5-12.) Mr. Bahr saw Mr. Peterson
walking “very aggressively” towards him, and Mr. Peterson said to Mr. Bahr, “You’re
about to get fucked up.” (Tr., p.1568, Ls.7-17.)
At that point, Mr. Bahr pulled out his weapon and pointed it at Mr. Peterson.
(Tr., p.1568, Ls.18-22.) Mr. Peterson told Mr. Bahr two or three times, “You better clip
it.” (Tr., p.1569, Ls.8-13.) Mr. Bahr pulled the slide back, wanting Mr. Peterson to hear
it. (Tr., p.680, Ls.5-22, p.681, Ls.13-25, p.1570, Ls.13-21.) Mr. Peterson did not act
afraid, but instead continued towards Mr. Bahr. (Tr., p.682, Ls.6-23, p.1571, Ls.15-23.)
Mr. Bahr testified that Mr. Peterson looked “very, very angry” and “had his fists up in a
fighting position.” (Tr., p.1572, Ls.9-12.) Mr. Bahr testified he felt “scared for [his] life.”
(Tr., p.1573, Ls.7-8.)

Ms. Hamby testified that Mr. Peterson appeared to threaten

Mr. Bahr after Mr. Bahr displayed the gun:
Q.

What did you see happen [after you saw a gun]?

A.

There was an altercation. I heard Brandon Bahr and Zach
Peterson arguing whether or not the gun was loaded.
Do you recall what they said to each other? That was what they
said?

Q.
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A.

I remember Zach had said, “It’s not really loaded.” And the other
voice said, “You want to bet? Try me.”

Q.

What happened next?

A.

It looked as if Zach reached his arm up to go punch him in the face,
and the gun had fired.

(Tr., p.1453, Ls.9-20.) When Mr. Peterson was within arms’ reach of Mr. Bahr, Mr. Bahr
pulled the trigger and shot Mr. Peterson one time in the chest. (Tr., p.1573, Ls.20-21.)
Ms. Hamby testified Mr. Bahr then pointed the gun at her and ran away. (Tr., p.1454,
Ls.1-15.)

Mr. Bahr threw the gun into the grass, and drove away from the Depot.

(Tr., p.1607, L.21 – p.1608, L.6.) Mr. Bahr testified he intended to go back for the gun
later. (Tr., p.1576, Ls.3-8.)
Following two 911 calls, officers were dispatched to the Depot at approximately
8:40 pm, and responded with lights and sirens. (Tr., p.465, Ls.10-14, p.467, Ls.7-8.)
They found Mr. Peterson lying on the sidewalk, and Mr. Delguidice performing CPR.
(Tr., p.473, Ls.5-17, p.522, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Peterson was transported by ambulance to the
hospital, where he was pronounced dead. (Tr., p.608, Ls.6-11, p.814, L.9 – p.815, L.3.)
The gun which Mr. Bahr had used to shoot Mr. Peterson was found, with a live round in
its chamber, in the bushes at the Depot. (Tr., p.757, Ls.12-24., p.771, Ls.8-19, p.798,
Ls.6-11, p.944, Ls.18-20.)
Later that evening, Mr. Bahr was arrested without incident at his house and
transported to the police station. (Tr., p.716, Ls.6-19.) He was questioned after waiving
his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and confessed that he
had made a mistake and killed Mr. Peterson. (Tr., p.949, Ls.9-13, p.942, Ls.8-10.) He
also admitted to taking a firearm from his mother’s boyfriend. (Tr., p.942, Ls.16-22.)
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The detective who interviewed Mr. Bahr at the police station was asked at trial if
Mr. Bahr said he was scared of Mr. Peterson, and he answered, “Absolutely, yeah.
That was very clear.” (Tr., p.950, Ls.3-5.) At the end of the interview, Mr. Bahr wrote
an apology letter, stating he “made the biggest mistake of [his] life” and “[j]ust wanted to
scare [Mr. Peterson].” (Tr., p.960, Ls.3-25.) In one of his phone calls to his mother from
jail, which was played for the jury at trial, Mr. Bahr said, “I just went too far.” (Ex. 151, at
5:09-15.)
Mr. Bahr was charged by Indictment with first degree murder, aggravated assault
(based on his alleged act of pointing the gun at Ms. Hamby), a firearm enhancement,
grand theft, and petit theft. (R., pp.65-67.) The jury was instructed that, for Mr. Bahr to
be guilty of first degree murder, the State had to prove each of the following elements
beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

On or about September 23, 2015

2.

in the State of Idaho

3.

the defendant Brandon Bahr engaged in conduct which caused the
death of Zacheriah Neil Peterson,

4.

the defendant acted without justification or excuse,

5.

with malice aforethought, and

6.

the murder was a willful, deliberate, and premediated killing.
Premeditation means to consider beforehand whether to kill or not
to kill, and then to decide to kill. There does not have to be any
appreciable period of time during which the decision to kill was
considered, as long as it was reflected upon before the decision
was made. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it
includes an intent to kill, is not premeditation.

(R., p.314.) The jury was also instructed on the elements of second degree murder,
voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter. (R., pp.319, 322, 324.)
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During closing argument, the State presented the jury with a PowerPoint slide
stating:
Premeditation means to consider beforehand whether to kill or not to kill.
There does not have to be any appreciable period of time during
which the decision to kill was considered, as long as it was reflected
upon before the decision was made. Premeditation is not a mere
unconsidered or rash impulse.
(Ct. Ex. A (emphasis in original).)

Counsel for Mr. Bahr objected to this slide as

misstating the district court’s instruction to the jury, and the district court overruled the
objection. (Tr., p.1715, Ls.9-16.)
The jury submitted one question to the district court during the course of its
deliberations. It asked, “Is the verbalization of a threat ‘I’m going to kill you’ the same as
the decision to kill?” (Ct. Ex. B.) The district court proposed to respond to this question
by stating, “This is for the jury to determine.” (Tr., p.1793, Ls.24-25.) Defense counsel
objected to the district court’s proposal, saying, “Your Honor, I think the actual answer to
the question is no, and so I would prefer that we answer it in the negative.” (Tr., p.1794,
Ls.5-7.) The district court overruled this objection and responded to the jury’s question
by stating, in writing, “This is for you to decide as the jury.” (Ct. Ex. B.)
The jury found Mr. Bahr guilty of first degree murder; not guilty of aggravated
assault; guilty of grand theft; and guilty of petit theft. (R., pp.346-50.) The district court
sentenced Mr. Bahr as follows: for first degree murder, a unified sentence of life
imprisonment, with 25 years fixed; for grand theft, a unified sentence of 14 years, with 7
years fixed, to be served concurrently; for petit theft, 180 days in Ada County Jail.
(Tr., p.1845, L.23 – p.1847, L.2.) The judgment of conviction was filed on June 27,
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2016, and Mr. Bahr filed a timely Notice of Appeal on June 29, 2016. (R., pp.352-56,
358-61.)
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ISSUES
I.

Was Mr. Bahr’s constitutional right to due process violated when the district court
incorrectly instructed the jury in response to a question concerning the element of
premeditation?

II.

Should this Court vacate Mr. Bahr’s conviction for grand theft because there was
insufficient evidence to support the conviction?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
Mr. Bahr’s Constitutional Right To Due Process Was Violated When The District Court
Incorrectly Instructed The Jury In Response To A Question Concerning The Element Of
Premeditation
A.

Introduction
During deliberations, the jury asked, “Is the verbalization of a threat, “I’m going to

kill you,” the same as the decision to kill?” (Ct. Ex. B.) In response, the district court
instructed the jury that this was for the jury to determine.

This instruction violated

Mr. Bahr’s constitutional right to due process because it misstated the law on
premeditation and relieved the State of its burden to prove an essential element of the
offense of first degree murder. The jury was allowed to reach its verdict based upon the
erroneous instruction, and because premeditation was a contested element, this Court
must vacate Mr. Bahr’s first degree murder conviction and remand this case to the
district court for a new trial on that charge.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury presents a question of law

over which this Court exercises free review.” State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 239 (1999)
(citation omitted). “When reviewing jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as
a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect applicable law.”

State v.

Parsons, 153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012). “Typically, under the harmless error test,
once the defendant shows that a constitutional violation occurred, the State has the
burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not contribute
to the jury’s verdict.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). However, there are
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exceptions to the general harmless error standard. Id. If a “jury reached its verdict
based upon erroneous instruction an appellate court shall generally vacate” the
conviction and remand the case to the lower court. Id. at 228. “However, in the limited
instance where the jury received proper instruction on all but one element of an offense,
and ‘[w]here a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted
element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly
found to be harmless.’” Id. (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 79 (2004)). Even
in this limited circumstance, if a reasonable jury “could have found that the state failed
to prove the omitted element then the appellate court shall vacate and remand.” Id.

C.

The District Court’s Instruction, In Response To The Jury’s Question, Violated
Mr. Bahr’s Constitutional Right To Due Process Because It Misstated The Law
On Premeditation And Relieved The State Of Its Burden To Prove An Essential
Element Of The Offense Of First Degree Murder
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states “[n]o person shall

be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment states “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV. The Idaho Constitution also guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law.” ID. CONST. art. I, §13. The United
States Supreme Court has held that “[in criminal trials, ‘the State must prove every
element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect
to that requirement.’”

State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749 (2007) (quoting

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004)). An erroneous instruction that relieves
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the State of its burden to prove an element of an offense can be characterized as a
violation of the constitutional right to due process. See id.; see also Parsons, 153 Idaho
at 669.
Mr. Bahr confessed to shooting Mr. Bahr shortly after the offense, and testified at
trial that he shot and killed Mr. Peterson. (Tr., p.949, Ls.9-13, p.942, Ls.8-10.) Though
there was no evidence presented that Mr. Bahr ever threatened Mr. Peterson directly,
Mr. Bahr exchanged text messages with his ex-girlfriend, in which he accused her of
cheating on him and threatened to kill Mr. Peterson. (Tr., p.932, L.10 – p.937, L.14.)
The most direct threat that Mr. Bahr made to Mr. Peterson was a text message he sent
to Ms. Havlina saying, “Sure your man wants to do this? Single you’re going to be, ho.”
(Tr., p.665, L.18 – p.666, L.18, p.937, Ls.5-14, p.1553, Ls.1-25.)
With respect to first degree murder, the jury was instructed that “[p]remeditation
means to consider beforehand whether to kill or not to kill, and then decide to kill.”
(R., p.314.) The jury was also instructed that “[a] mere unconsidered and rash impulse,
even though it includes an intent to kill, is not premeditation.” (R., p.314.) Despite
receiving these instructions, the jury was confused about whether a threat to kill
constituted a decision to kill. (Ct. Ex. B.) The jury asked, “Is the verbalization of a
threat, “I’m going to kill you,” the same as the decision to kill?” (Ct. Ex. B.) This
question, which was the only question asked by the jury, reveals that the jury was
struggling with the question of whether the killing of Mr. Peterson was premeditated.
The district court told the prosecutor and counsel for Mr. Bahr that it proposed to
respond to the jury’s question by stating, “This is for the jury to determine.” (Tr., p.1793,
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Ls.24-25.) Defense counsel objected, stating “the actual answer to the question is no.”
(Tr., p.1794, Ls.5-7.) The district court overruled this objection, explaining:
The reason I propose that answer is that the jury is to determine the
meaning and the weight to be given to any statement made, not me. And
that is a question that goes to the meaning to something that was said,
and that’s for the jury to determine.
(Tr., p.1794, Ls.8-12.)

The district court then responded to the jury’s question by

stating, “This is for you to decide as the jury.” (Ct. Ex. B.) This was an improper
instruction as it misstated the law on premeditation. While a threat to kill may be
evidence of a decision to kill, the district court should have instructed the jury that a
threat and the decision to kill are not the same.
Under Idaho law, an unlawful killing constitutes first degree murder only if it is
“accompanied with a deliberate and clear intent to take life” and “[t]he intent to kill must
be the result of deliberate premeditation . . . formed upon the pre-existing reflection, and
not upon a sudden heat of passion.” State v. Snowden, 79 Idaho 266, 273-74 (1957)
(quoting State v. Shuff, 9 Idaho 115, __, 72 P.664, 668 (1903)).

Premeditation is

defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[c]onscious consideration and planning that
precedes an act (such as committing a crime); the pondering of an action before
carrying it out.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). While a jury can determine
whether a defendant had an intent to kill when he made a verbal threat, a verbal threat
is not, as a matter of law, the same as deliberate premeditation formed upon preexisting reflection.
Based on the district court’s instruction, the jury could have believed—falsely—
that it could determine that the verbalization of a threat to kill is, ipso facto, the same as
a decision to kill. In other words, the jury could have found Mr. Bahr guilty of first
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degree murder because he threatened to kill Mr. Peterson, and then later killed him.
The district court’s instruction relieved the State of its burden to prove premeditation,
which is a defined and necessary element of first degree murder. See I.C. § 18-4003
(setting forth degrees of murder); see also Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 709-10 (1967)
(noting the distinction between first and second degree murder “probes the killer’s
intent”). By misstating the law on premeditation and lowering the State’s burden, the
district court’s instruction violated Mr. Bahr’s constitutional right to due process, and
permitted the jury to find Mr. Bahr guilty of first degree murder absent sufficient
evidence of premeditation. See, e.g., State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 341-42 (2011)
(concluding district court’s answer to jury’s question was error because it would have
permitted the jury to find defendant guilty of conduct that did not constitute the crime
charged).

D.

Mr. Bahr’s First Degree Murder Conviction Be Vacated
The only question the jury asked during its deliberations concerned the question

of premeditation, and the district court erred in instructing the jury that it was for the jury
to determine whether a threat to kill is the same as a decision to kill.

As previously

noted, if a jury reached its verdict based upon an erroneous jury instruction and the
element addressed was contested or not supported by overwhelming evidence, this
Court must vacate the conviction. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. In the case at hand, the
element of premeditation was highly contested and was not supported by overwhelming
evidence.
Whether the killing of Mr. Peterson was premeditated was the critical question in
this case. The jury heard that Mr. Bahr sent threatening text messages to Ms. Havlina
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on the day of his arranged meeting with Mr. Peterson. (Tr., p.932, L.10 – p.937, L.14.)
But the jury also heard evidence that Mr. Bahr was afraid of Mr. Peterson, intended only
to scare him, and never intended to kill him. (Tr., p.1554, Ls.2-10, p.1565, L.17 –
p.1566, L.4, p.950, Ls.3-5, p.960, Ls.3-25.) Mr. Bahr was extremely upset when he
learned from the detectives that Mr. Peterson had died from his injuries, and wrote in an
apology letter that he “made the biggest mistake of [his] life” and “[j]ust wanted to scare
[Mr. Peterson].” (Tr., p.960, Ls.3-25.) In one of his phone calls to his mother from jail,
which was played for the jury at trial, Mr. Bahr said, “I just went too far.” (Ex. 151, at
5:09-15.)

The jury was instructed on the elements of first degree murder, second

degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter, and could easily
have found Mr. Bahr guilty of a lesser offense due to the lack of evidence on
premeditation. (R., pp.314, 319, 322, 324.) Because the element of premeditation was
contested, this Court must vacate Mr. Bahr’s first degree murder conviction and remand
the case for a new trial.
Even if this Court decides that it should apply a harmless error test, because
Mr. Bahr objected to the district court’s erroneous instruction, the State has the burden
of demonstrating the error was harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. The State cannot
meet its burden because the error in instruction concerned the element of
premeditation. Because Mr. Bahr had admitted that he caused Mr. Peterson’s death,
premeditation was the critical issue in determining which level of criminal homicide was
applicable to Mr. Bahr’s actions.1

1

Mr. Bahr argued the theory of self-defense at the trial. However, the jury did not
accept this theory and Mr. Bahr has no grounds upon which to challenge this jury
determination.
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The State’s closing argument compounded the error in the jury instructions. In
closing, the State presented the jury with a PowerPoint slide stating:
Premeditation means to consider beforehand whether to kill or not to kill.
There does not have to be any appreciable period of time during
which the decision to kill was considered, as long as it was reflected
upon before the decision was made. Premeditation is not a mere
unconsidered or rash impulse.
(Ct. Ex. A (emphasis in original).)

Counsel for Mr. Bahr objected to this slide as

misstating the district court’s prior instruction to the jury, and the district court overruled
the objection. (Tr., p.1715, Ls.9-16.) The district court said, “For the most part it is
worded identically. There’s a slight change that does not change the meaning or the
content of the last sentence.” (Tr., p.1715, Ls.13-15.) The “slight change” did indeed
change the meaning and content of the last sentence. The jury had been instructed by
the district court that “[a] mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes
an intent to kill, is not premeditation.” (R., p.314.) Additionally, the slide’s first sentence
was also inaccurate. The slide omitted the words, found in instruction number 17, “and
then decide to kill.”

These changes and omissions in the slide muddled the

premeditation requirement. The district court’s erroneous instruction to the jury, that it
was for the jury to determine whether Mr. Bahr’s threats towards Mr. Peterson were the
same as a decision to kill, was compounded by the State’s use of this misleading slide
in closing argument.
The district court’s instruction lowered the State’s burden, in violation of
Mr. Bahr’s constitutional right to due process, and the error was not harmless. This
Court should vacate Mr. Bahr’s first degree murder conviction and remand this case to
the district court for a new trial on that charge.
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II.
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Bahr’s Conviction For Grand Theft Because There Was
Insufficient Evidence To Support The Conviction

A.

Introduction
Mr. Bahr asserts that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support

the jury’s guilty verdict for the crime of grand theft. The State failed to prove that, at the
time of the taking, Mr. Bahr had the specific intent to permanently deprive or
appropriate. The State presented evidence that Mr. Bahr took the handgun, but failed
to prove his intent at the time of the taking.

As such, the State’s evidence was

insufficient to prove Mr. Bahr committed grand theft.

B.

Standard Of Review
The sufficiency of the evidence presented to sustain a conviction can be raised

for the first time on appeal. State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877-878 (1995).
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A
finding of guilt will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial
evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Warburton, 145 Idaho 760, 761-62 (Ct. App. 2008).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court will conduct an
independent review of the evidence in the record to determine whether a reasonable
mind could conclude that each material element of the offense was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Willard, 129 Idaho at 828. “For evidence to be substantial, it must
be of sufficient quality that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion.”
State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg.
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Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 (1996)).

This Court does not substitute its view of the

evidence for that of the jury with regard to matters of the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to attach to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from
the evidence. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998). Additionally,
the Court will construe all of the evidence in favor of upholding the verdict. State v.
Glass, 139 Idaho 815, 818 (Ct. App. 2003).

C.

The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The Jury’s Verdict
Finding Mr. Bahr Guilty Of Grand Theft
Mr. Bahr asserts that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s

verdict for grand theft and that his conviction must be vacated. He was charged, in
Count III of the Indictment, with the crime of grand theft. (R., pp.65-66.) Specifically,
the charge was as follows:
That the Defendant, BRANDON TYLER BAHR, on our about the 23rd day
of September, 2015, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did wrongfully
take a firearm, to-wit: a semi-automatic handgun from another with the
intent to appropriate to himself certain property of another and/or deprive
another of property.
(R., pp.65-66.)
On the night of September 23, 2015, Mr. Bahr took a semi-automatic handgun
from the nightstand of his mother’s boyfriend, Rusty Powell. (Tr., p.1555, Ls.13-17.)
Mr. Bahr has never denied taking the handgun, and testified during trial that he had
done so. (Tr., p.942, Ls.16-22, p.1041, Ls.22-25, p.954, Ls.19-21, p.1554, Ls.1-13,
p.1555, Ls.13-23, p.1557, Ls.19-23, p.1590, Ls.12-20.) It is equally clear that Mr. Bahr
did not have permission to take the handgun from Rusty Powell or his son, Ryan
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Powell, who occasionally had possession and control over the handgun. (Tr., p.1412,
Ls.11-19, p.1356, Ls.5-19, p.1364, Ls.17-24, p.1590, Ls.21-22.)
However, Mr. Bahr asserts that he did not have the requisite intent for grand theft
because when he took the handgun, he did not specifically intend to either deprive
Mr. Powell of the handgun or to appropriate the handgun, permanently or for an
extended period of time. Mr. Bahr testified that his plan when he took the handgun was
“to take it back home and put it back.” (Tr., p.1558, Ls.4-9.) Tragically, the handgun
was used by Mr. Bahr and as a result Mr. Peterson passed away. (Tr., p.1591, Ls.5-7.)
Mr. Bahr’s plan to immediately return the handgun was impacted by the stress of the
confrontation with Mr. Peterson and he tossed the gun into some bushes or grasses at
the Depot. (Tr., p.1575, Ls.5-23, p.1670, L.21 – p.1608, L.4.) Nonetheless, he was still
planning on retrieving the handgun and returning it to the house, a plan he testified to
during trial and informed detectives about during his interrogation. (Tr., p.996, L.24 –
p.997, L.6, p.1575, L.24 – p.1576, L.9, p.1591, Ls.8-22; State’s Exhibit 149.) During his
interrogation, Mr. Bahr also informed officers where he had left the handgun and it was
later located in this general location. (Tr., p.771, L.3 – p.772, L.12, p.786, Ls.6-20,
p.944, L.8 – p.945, L.16, p.990, Ls.10-17.)
The jury found Mr. Bahr guilty of grand theft. (R., p.349.)

1.

The State’s Intent Theories

Recognizing that the grand theft charge was not the primary focus of this trial, the
presentation of evidence and argument regarding the alleged grand theft was
understandably limited.

Due to the lack of direct evidence on the topic, closing

arguments provided the only insight as to the State’s theory about Mr. Bahr’s alleged
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intent. The State’s limited closing argument on the grand theft charge focused primarily
on the intent to permanently deprive. (Tr., p.1724, L.13 – p.1726, L.4.) Yet, the State
never specifically argued that Mr. Bahr had formed the intent to permanently deprive or
appropriate at the time of the taking:
The intent to permanently deprive. Yesterday on the stand the
defendant testified that it was his plan to go back and get the murder
weapon.
In his flight, when he fled after shooting and killing Zacheriah
Peterson, you know he throws that loaded weapon.
...
The defendant leaves it there, flees the scene, and yet he’s telling
you it was his plan to somehow sneak back to the train depot, a crime
scene surrounded by police officers, he said he heard someone else say,
Call 911, he knew the police were going to be there; he was going to go
back and get that gun, a murder weapon and put it back in Rusty Powell’s
nightstand. Does that make sense? Is that reasonable?
The intent to permanently deprive is defined in Instruction 38 that
you will have with you back in the jury room.
The intent to dispose of the property in such a manner or under
such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such
property.
That’s what the defendant did in this case. He stole that gun to
carry out his plan to make his pain go away; to get rid of Zach, to get rid of
Ryan, to make his pain go away.
He had the intent to dispose of that semi-automatic pistol in such a
manner or under such circumstances as would render unlikely the owner
will ever recover the Makarov.
. . . The defendant had the intent to permanently deprive. It is not
reasonable to believe that he planned to go back and get that weapon.
He’s guilty of grand theft, proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Tr., p.1724, L.19 – p.1726, L.4.)
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Because the closing argument is vague and imprecise, it arguably provides for
two competing theories regarding intent: either (1) Mr. Bahr developed the intent to
appropriate or deprive after he took the handgun, near the time of disposal, or (2) the
disposal of the handgun at the crime scene was Mr. Bahr’s plan from the beginning.
Both of these theories are problematic. The first theory is legally invalid and the second
is supported neither by direct evidence nor reasonable inferences therefrom.

a.

If Mr. Bahr Developed The Intent To Appropriate Or Deprive After
The Taking, He Cannot Be Guilty Of Grand Theft Because The
Requisite Intent Must Exist At The Time Of The Taking

Grand theft is a specific intent crime.
(Ct. App. 1997).

State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 927

Under I.C. § 18–2403(1), “a person ... commits theft when,

with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself ..., he
wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.”

To

“deprive” another of property means permanently to withhold the property from the
owner or dispose of it in such a way that it unlikely the owner will recover the property.
I.C. § 18–2402(3)(a)-(b). To “appropriate” to oneself the property of another means
permanently to exercise control over it or to dispose of the property “for the benefit of
oneself.” I.C. § 18–2402(1)(a)-(b).
Since at least 1902, it has been “well settled that the felonious intent must exist
at the time of the taking.” State v. Riggs, 8 Idaho 630, 951 (1902). In Riggs, the trial
court provided the following instruction: “If the defendant wrongfully and unlawfully, and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner, . . . but as a tresparser and
wrongdoer, took . . . the property described in the information, not then intending to
steal the same, but that thereafter, while still in such wrongful possession of said
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property, he feloniously appropriated the same to his own use, such taking and
appropriation constitute upon the part of the defendant the crime of larceny as fully and
completely as though such felonious intention had existed in the defendant at the first
taking of such property.” Id. at 951. Defense counsel objected to the instruction and
requested that the jury be instructed that: “If the jury believe from the evidence that the
defendant had no felonious intent to steal the property at the time he took it, then you
must acquit, even if you believe he subsequently conceived the intent to appropriate it.”
Id. at 951.

The Idaho Supreme Court found it was error to both provide the first

instruction and to deny the defense’s requested instruction because the intent to deprive
or appropriate must exist at the time of the taking. Id. The Court based the decision on
a number of similar holdings:
In Martinez v. State, 16 Tex. App. 122, that court says: “Property that is
lost, equally with other property, may be the subject of theft. To
constitute theft of lost property, however, the fraudulent intent, which is the
gist of the offense, must exist in the mind of the taker at the time of
the taking, and in lost property the time of the taking is the time of the
finding of the property. If the fraudulent intent did not exist at the time of
the taking, no subsequent fraudulent intent in relation to the property will
constitute theft.” Warren v. State, 17 Tex. App. 207, holds to the same
principle. In Beckham v. State, 14 South. 859, that court says: “Where
defendant found a hog in a swamp at high water, and took it home, an
instruction that, unless the felonious intent existed at the time of
the taking, defendant was not guilty, should have been given.” Clark, Cr.
Law, at page 262: “In addition to the taking and removal of the property by
trespass, there must be an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his
property therein, and the intent must exist at the time of the taking. This is
absolutely essential.” See, also, Rev. St. § 6341; State v. Rechnitz (Mont.)
52 Pac. 264; McClain, Cr. Law, § 571. A number of other authorities have
been called to our attention bearing on this question, but, as they all have
the same tendency, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the question
further.
Id.
In the case at hand, the jury received the following instruction:
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INSTRUCTION NO. 37
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Grand Theft, the state must
prove each of the following:
1.

On or about September 23, 2015

2.

in the State of Idaho

3.
the defendant Brandon Bahr wrongfully took property to wit:
a Makarov semiautomatic pistol;
3.

from an owner,

5.
with the intent to deprive an owner of the property or to
appropriate the property. . . .
(R., p.334.) Mr. Bahr asserts that this instruction conforms to the historically noted
intent requirements. Although it does not specifically state that the intent had to be
formed contemporaneously to the taking, the plain language of the instruction provides
that Mr. Bahr had to possess the requisite intent at the time of the taking.
The State’s first theory, that Mr. Bahr developed the intent to appropriate or
deprive at the scene of the altercation, well after the handgun had been taken, is not a
legally viable theory. Mr. Bahr acknowledges that the direct evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom may support the conclusion that he became flustered or frightened
after his altercation with Mr. Peterson and, only at that time, formed the intent to dispose
of the weapon by throwing it in the grasses or bushes. The State’s closing argument
suggests that Mr. Bahr’s action of throwing the gun into the grasses illustrated his intent
at that exact moment in time, not at the time of the taking as is required for a grand theft
conviction. While this formation of intent theory is supported by the evidence, it is
insufficient for a grand theft conviction. The State had a duty to prove each element
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beyond a reasonable doubt, including the specific intent element, and under this theory,
it failed to meet its burden.

b.

Mr. Bahr Did Not Have The Requisite Intent At The Time Of The
Taking

Additionally, the evidence at trial did not indicate that, at the time of the taking,
Mr. Bahr had formed the intent to dispose of the handgun at the crime scene, as
suggested by the State’s second theory.
The State failed to prove that Mr. Bahr had the requisite intent, at the time of the
taking, either through direct evidence or reasonable inferences. Intent is established
“by the commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the
offense.” I.C. § 18–115. “The element of intent need not be shown by direct evidence
but may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” State v. Krommenhoek, 107 Idaho
188, 189 (Ct. App. 1984). As the jury was instructed, at the time of the taking, Mr. Bahr
must have had the specific intent to deprive or appropriate to be guilty of grand theft:

INSTRUCTION NO. 38
The phrase "intent to deprive" means:
a. The intent to withhold property or cause it to be withheld from an
owner permanently or for so extended a period or under such
circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is
lost to such owner; or
b. The intent to dispose of the property in such manner or under
such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such
property.
The phrase "intent to appropriate" means:
a. The intent to exercise control over property, or to aid someone
other than the owner to exercise control over it, permanently or for so
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extended a period of time or under such circumstances as to acquire the
major portion of its economic value or benefit; or
b. The intent to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or
someone other than the owner.
(R., p.336.)
There was no direct evidence that Mr. Bahr intended to either appropriate or
deprive at the time of the taking. Mr. Bahr’s plan when he took the handgun was “to
take it back home and put it back.” (Tr., p.1558, Ls.4-9.) Despite the fact that he
ultimately tossed the gun into some bushes or grasses at the Depot (Tr., p.1575, Ls.523, p.1670, L.21 – p.1608, L.4), he was still planning on retrieving the handgun and
returning it to the house (Tr., p.996, L.24 – p.997, L.6, p.1575, L.24 – p.1576, L.9,
p.1591, Ls.8-22). No direct evidence to the contrary was presented. Additionally, the
requisite intent could not be reasonably inferred from the evidence presented.
The State’s second theory appears to be that, at the time of the taking, Mr. Bahr
planned to dispose of the handgun at the crime scene.

However this is not a

reasonable inference. Instead, logic dictates that this could not have been Mr. Bahr’s
plan from the beginning. It is ridiculous to think that a person would steal a handgun
with the specific plan to dispose of it at the crime scene, the location most likely to be
thoroughly searched. The mere fact that this is what actually occurred does not prove
that this was the intention at the time of the taking.
The State supports this theory with the notion that it is unreasonable to believe
that Mr. Bahr would be able to go back to the crime scene to retrieve the gun. Mr. Bahr
asserts this is merely a red herring. Whether or not Mr. Bahr would actually be able to
retrieve the handgun after he disposed of it is irrelevant; the relevant concern is his
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intent at the time of the taking.2 Further, this argument does not lend any credence to a
finding that Mr. Bahr had formed the intent to dispose of the weapon at the crime scene
at the time of the taking. A reasonable interpretation of the evidence, based upon the
disposal of the handgun and the disposal location, shows that Mr. Bahr formed the
intent to dispose of the handgun at the crime scene, only after using it at the Boise
Depot.
Further, there is no evidence to support other inferences that Mr. Bahr had the
intent to permanently deprive Mr. Powell of the handgun or appropriate the same at the
time of the taking. Instead, it is clear that Mr. Bahr’s intent at the time of the taking was
for the depravation of the handgun to be temporary, not permanent.

This is not only

based upon his testimony to that fact, but also the inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Mr. Bahr took the handgun to use for the limited purpose to either threaten or,
under the State’s theory, to injure. His need for the handgun was for a very limited time,

2

For the sake of argument, there is no evidence that Mr. Bahr would not have
attempted to later retrieve the handgun. It may be naive for Mr. Bahr to believe he
would be able to go back to a crime scene to retrieve a weapon, but we cannot know if
he may have actually tried, if given the opportunity. He was taken into custody less than
three hours after the altercation, at 11:28 p.m. on September 23, 2015. (Tr., p.845, L.25
– p.846, L.23.) The quick arrest did not allow for any opportunity to retrieve the
handgun. This is in stark contrast to the facts State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759 (1987). In
Hart, the defendant testified that his intent at the time he took the relevant items, was
only to temporarily pawn them until he received some money from his mother. Hart,
112 Idaho at 761. He asserted that when he received the money on April 17th he went
to retrieve the items and return them, but that the police had prevented such action. Id.
However, the State was able to produce evidence that the property hold was not placed
on the items until April 18th and that the defendant did not know of police involvement
until that time. Id. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence to show that the
defendant did not return to retrieve the items, that he never intended to do so, and that,
as a result, he had the requisite intent for grand theft. Id. Unlike the defendant in Hart,
Mr. Bahr never had an opportunity to follow-through with his plan to retrieve the
handgun from the crime scene and the same intent inferences cannot be drawn under
these facts.
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an altercation lasting no more than a few minutes. In short, he had only a temporary
need for the handgun. If his plan, from the time of the taking, was to dispose of the gun
after the temporary use, it is only logical that he would have revealed this intent by
disposing of it a location where it would be difficult to find, not throwing it in the crime
scene grasses or bushes in a panic. He also would have likely disposed of the extra
clip, found in his center console. (State’s Ex. No. 96.)
Additionally, none of the typical inferences drawn to uphold a grand theft
conviction apply in this case. Mr. Bahr did not steal the handgun to obtain a monitory
gain by selling or trading it. There was no evidence that he had any continuing use for a
gun or a continuing desire to possess a gun. In fact, he testified he had only fired a gun
on one previous occasion, as an eleven-year-old boy scout.

(Tr., p.1554, L.24 –

p.1555, L.5.) As such, Mr. Bahr had nothing to gain through a permanent deprivation or
appropriation. Instead, all reasonable inferences lead to finding that his intent was
merely to temporarily use the handgun or borrow it without permission.
The State had a duty to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt,
including the specific intent element. There was no direct evidence nor reasonable
inferences from the evidence presented that proves that Mr. Bahr acted with the intent
to deprive or appropriate, at the time of the taking. As such, the State failed to meet
their burden to prove the intent element.

D.

This Court Must Vacate Mr. Bahr’s Conviction
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution precludes conviction

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which a defendant is charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see
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also State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54 (Ct. App. 1996). Because the State failed to present
substantial and competent evidence that proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Mr. Bahr committed grand theft, this Court must vacate his conviction.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Bahr respectfully requests that this Court vacate his murder conviction and
remand this case for a new trial. Additionally, he respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his grand theft conviction and remand with instructions to enter an acquittal for
that charge.
DATED this 26th day of May, 2017.
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